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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1994). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are whether the legal 
conclusions of the trial court are correct as to the following: 
1. Should the trial court finding that there was no fraud in 
this matter be upheld? 
2. Should the remedy ordered by the trial court be affirmed? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The proper standard of review when appealing a trial court's 
failure to find fraud is a clearly erroneous standard. Alta 
Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 
1991); Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
The standard of review where an equitable remedy is being 
attacked is a clearly erroneous standard. LHIW, Inc. v. 
DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988); Ferris v. Jennings, 595 
P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979). 
A marshalling of the evidence is required for this standard 
of review. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
There is no determinative authority. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case stems from a boundary dispute between adjoining 
property owners. (R. at 24). The dispute was created both by 
errors in legal descriptions, and surveys which used differing 
starting points. (R. at 689). Plaintiff obtained quitclaim 
deeds to a 20-foot strip of real property located between 
Plaintiff's and Defendants' east/west boundary. This strip of 
real property was not contained in the legal description of 
either Defendants' or Plaintiff's deeds. The title to the 20-
foot strip of real property rested in a predecessor in interest 
to the Defendants' property. Since Defendants claimed that their 
east/west boundary line abutted the foundation of Plaintiff's 
building, Plaintiff obtained the quitclaim deeds to protect his 
real property by extending his west boundary by 20 feet. (R. at 
725 page 63 In 10-17; R at 726 page 67 In 10-21; R at 738 page 
113 In 6-17; R at 739 page 117 In 2-9). 
This action was initially filed against Utah County to 
enforce the recording of the quitclaim deeds. (R. at 7). 
Defendants were joined in order to obtain a quiet title to the 
20-foot strip of property and to proceed with a trespass cause of 
action. (R. at 24) Defendants counterclaimed for quiet title, 
fraud, and emotional distress. (R. at 83). 
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B. Proceedings Below. 
Defendant Utah County was dismissed from this action. (R. 
at 72) . The issues regarding ownership of the disputed strip of 
land were decided through cross motions for summary judgment. (R. 
at 507, 509, 511). (Those issues are not before the court on 
appeal). The remaining issues were reserved for trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Because this is an appeal of a factual determination made by 
the trial court, (See Brief of Appellants at pgs 2-3), the facts 
for purposes of review are those found by the trial court (R at 
694-687) and are as follows : 
1. Plaintiff Jack Perry is a resident of Utah County, State 
of Utah. 
2. Defendants Verl A. Jensen and Margene H. Jensen are 
husband and wife and are residents of Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant C & A Construction, Inc. is a corporation 
organized under the laws of the State of Utah having its 
principal place of business in Utah County, State of Utah. 
4. Most of the events forming the basis of the causes of 
action occurred in Utah County, State of Utah. 
5. In March 1988, Defendants Jensen purchased the real 
property located at 900 N. and 900 E., City of Provo, County of 
Utah, State of Utah. 
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6. Plaintiff Perry acquired the apartment complex known as 
the Robert E. Lee Apartments located at 876 E. 900 N., city of 
Provo, State of Utah, on September 30, 1988. 
7. The Perry property abuts the Jensen property on the West 
and South boundary lines of the Jensen property. 
8. The Jensen property has been sold and resold a number 
of times in the last fifteen years. Multiple mistakes in the 
property descriptions on the deeds and in the surveys had created 
uncertainty as to the actual location of the boundary line 
between the parties' properties. These errors in property 
descriptions have been resolved by the Court in its Summary 
Judgment dated November 23, 1993. 
9. Defendants' Jensen contracted with C & A Construction, 
Inc. to build an eight-plex apartment building on the Jensen 
property. 
10. In May 1989, construction began on the 8-plex apartment 
building. 
11. Defendants Jensen did not perform a survey when they 
purchased the property in March 1988, nor did they perform a 
survey prior to the commencement of construction. 
12. A survey of the Jensen property was performed in 1985 
by Dudley and Associates. 
13. The Dudley survey in 1985 fixed the West boundary line 
of the Jensen property abutting the foundation of the buildings 
on the Perry property. 
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14. Perry challenged the location of the West boundary line 
of the Jensen property as determined by the 1985 Dudley survey. 
15. As a result of the dispute between Perry and Jensen as 
to the actual location of the West boundary line of the Jensen 
property, the City of Provo required the Jensens to perform a 
survey in May 1989 shortly after construction on the 8-plex 
began. 
16. Glen Calder, at the request of Jensen, performed a 
survey of the Jensen property in May 198 9. 
17. Glen Calder using the same legal description as Dudley 
used in 1985, fixed the West boundary line of the Jensen property 
abutting the foundation of Perry's apartments. 
18. Jensen then hired Dudley and Associates to perform 
another survey. 
19. The Dudley survey also set the West boundary line 
abutting the foundation of Perry's building. 
20. Perry hired Robert Gunnell to perform a survey. 
21. The Gunnell survey placed the west property line 
approximately 6.5 feet from the foundation of Perry's building. 
22. The Provo City building department, after the west 
boundary lines had been established approximately six feet from 
the Perry building foundation, issued a permit on June 9, 1989. 
23. On July 10, 1989, Perry obtained a restraining order 
stopping construction by Jensen. 
24. On July 10, 1989, Defendants obtained an order setting 
aside the restraining order. 
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25. Defendants were not delayed in the construction of 
their apartment building by the obtaining of the restraining 
order by Plaintiff. 
26. The construction of the 8-plex was completed within a 
reasonable time. 
27. During the construction process, the Defendants Jensen 
made changes to the plans for the condominiums that caused the 
delay in locating long-term financing for the project. 
28. Defendants Jensen were not hindered in obtaining a 
construction loan by any of the actions of Perry. 
29. Defendants Jensen completed the 8-plex and received a 
certificate of occupancy on September 1, 1989. 
30. Defendants were not delayed or hindered in completion 
of the 8-plex by any conduct or actions of Perry. 
31. There is no evidence that the Defendants Jensen 
suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the actions of 
Perry. 
32. The hives suffered by Defendant Margene Jensen were 
the result of stress which may have been caused by a number of 
factors but cannot be said to have been proximately caused by the 
conduct and/or actions of the Plaintiff. 
33. There is no evidence that Plaintiff intentionally 
entered into conduct with the purpose of causing the Defendants 
emotional distress. 
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34. During construction, the Defendants trespassed on the 
Plaintiff's property for which the Plaintiff should be 
compensated in the sum of $1.00 (One Dollar). 
35. Defendants removed shrubbery, trees and topsoil from 
the Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff is not entitled to damages 
for loss of trees, shrubs or other landscaping because Plaintiff 
cannot establish a value for the items allegedly removed. 
36. There is no evidence that Plaintiff made any 
fraudulent statements to Defendants or to anyone else. 
37. There is no evidence that Plaintiff engaged in 
fraudulent conduct toward Defendant or anyone else. 
38. The footings of the Defendants Jensens retaining wall 
extends onto the Plaintiffs property. 
(R. at 694-687.) (Marshalled evidence in support of the facts 
found by the trial court are set forth separately in another 
portion of this brief). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendants' appeal should be denied because: 
1. Defendants' have failed to marshal the evidence; 
2. Defendants did not rely on Plaintiffs alleged 
misrepresentation; 
3. Defendants failed to cite authority and to cite to the 
record in support of their argument against the trial court's 
awarding of an equitable remedy for Defendants' encroachment; 
7 
4. Defendants have failed to show that the trial court 
abused its discretion in awarding Plaintiff an equitable remedy 
for Defendants' encroachment. 
The appropriate standard of review for an attack on the 
trial court's failure to find fraud is a clearly erroneous 
standard which requires that Defendants must marshal the 
evidence. Defendants have failed to marshal the evidence in 
favor of the trial court's findings and attempt to offer 
carefully selected facts in their own favor, therefore, the 
appellate court should assume that the trial court's findings are 
supported by the record. 
One of the elements of a cause of action of fraud is that 
Defendants must show by clear and convincing evidence that they 
reasonably relied upon the alleged misrepresentations of 
Plaintiff. Defendants do not claim that they relied upon the 
alleged misrepresentations of Plaintiff but base their cause of 
action for fraud on the reliance of third parties who are not 
parties to this action. Defendants failed to present any 
evidence at trial supporting their reliance on the 
misrepresentations allegedly made by Plaintiff. In fact, 
Defendants do not claim that they relied on the 
misrepresentations allegedly made by Plaintiff, nor do they 
recognize that they must prove their reliance in order to 
establish a cause of action for fraud. Therefore, the court's 
finding should upheld by the appellate court. 
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Defendants failed to cite any authority or to cite to the 
record in support of their argument that the trial court erred in 
granting Plaintiff an equitable remedy for encroachment. Without 
citing authority and without citing to the record to support 
their argument, Defendants' argument and limited analysis is 
meaningless and the court should refuse to address this issue and 
assume the correctness of the trial court's findings and 
j udgment. 
The proper standard of review for the trial court fashioning 
an equitable remedy is an abuse of discretion. Courts have broad 
discretion in fashioning equitable remedies, and Defendants have 
failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in 
ordering the remedy in this case. LHIVJ, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 
P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988). 
Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee for 
having to defend against Defendants' appeal on the grounds that 
Defendants' appeal is frivolous. Defendants' appeal is not 
grounded in fact, is not supported by existing law, and does not 
attempt to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. Defendants' 
appeal is necessarily frivolous, and Plaintiff is entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorney's fee incurred in defending against 
Defendants' appeal. (Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT HAS NOT MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE, THEREFORE, 
FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BEYOND 
CHALLENGE. 
The standard of review in challenging the failure of the 
trial court to find fraud is a clearly erroneous standard. 
Wright argues on appeal that the jury did not have 
sufficient evidence upon which to base its verdict of fraud. 
We of course consider the evidence in a light favorable to 
the verdict and "we will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury where the verdict is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence." Von Hake v. Thomas, 
705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). Moreover, Wright's duty on 
appeal is to "marshal all the evidence supporting the 
verdict and demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient to support it." Id. (citing Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). With this standard 
of review in mind, we note that Wright's marshaling of the 
evidence is adequate to permit our consideration of this 
issue. 
Wright v. West Side Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah App. 1990). 
A clearly erroneous standard requires Defendants to marshal the 
evidence in support of the factual determinations of the trial 
court and, then, demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 
that the findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous. Id. 
at 512. 
Defendants, having failed to marshal the evidence, and 
having failed to demonstrate that the evidence fails to support 
the trial court's findings when viewed in a light most favorable 
to the Plaintiff is sufficient grounds to reject Defendants' 
10 
attack on the fraud finding. Crooks ton v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). 
Where a marshalling standard exists, the failure to marshal 
the evidence is not tolerated by appellate courts. (See Ashton 
v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). In Oneida/SLIC v. 
Oneida Cold Storage et. al., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) 
this court stated: 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual 
findings lightly. We repeatedly have set forth the heavy 
burden appellants must bear when challenging factual 
findings. To successfully appeal a trial court's findings 
of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 
"[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order 
to properly discharge the [marshalling] duty ...# the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists," 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah App. 1991); accord In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 
29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp v. Granite Mill, 849 
P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993) . Once appellants have 
established every pillar supporting their adversary's 
position, they then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support the 
trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. 
They must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making them xclearly erroneous.'" Bartell, 716 P.2d at 
886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage et. al., 872 P.2d 1051-1053, 
(Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
Because the Defendants are challenging the factual findings 
of the trial court, while refusing to marshal the evidence, an 
appellate court should not consider any factual issues on appeal 
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and assume the trial court's findings are supported by the 
record. 
If the evidence is not properly marshalled, we will assume 
the findings are supported and proceed to review "the 
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law in the case. 
Lake Philgas v. Valley Bank and Trust Company, 845 P. 2d 951, 959 
(Utah App. 1993),(quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 
(Utah 1991)). 
Therefore, the findings of the trial court must be upheld 
and the Defendant's appeal must be denied. 
II. THE MARSHALLED EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT DEFENDANT FAILED 
TO PRESENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SUPPORTING FRAUD. 
Although it has not been clearly argued by the Defendants, 
Defendants base their cause of action for fraud on 
misrepresentations allegedly made by Plaintiff to third parties, 
who are not parties to this lawsuit. The courts in Utah have 
recognized a cause of action for fraud on statements made to 
third parties in a professional/client relationship. Milliner v. 
Elmer Boxing Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).x However, Plaintiff 
cannot find any cases in Utah recognizing a cause of action for 
fraud based on misrepresentations to third parties which do not 
involve a professional/client relationship. 
The law governing fraud actions based on statements to third 
parties is found in Section 531 of the Restatement of Torts: 
xThe Milliner case involved statements made by an accountant 
to his client which were repeated by the client to a third-party. 
It was the third-party who sued the accountant. 
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One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject 
to liability to the person or class of persons whom he 
intends or has reason to expect to act or refrain from 
action in reliance upon the misrepresentation, for 
pecuniary loss suffered by them through their 
justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in 
which he intends or has reason to expect that conduct 
to be influenced. 
Section 531 has generally been applied to situations where a 
contractor has made fraudulent representations to a purchaser who 
tells the representations to a subsequent purchaser or in a 
professional/client relationship. See Woodward v. Deitrich, 378 
PA. Super. Ill, 548 A.2d 301,304,308,309,312,313,316. 
Assuming a cause of action for fraud based upon 
representations to third parties exist in Utah, under the facts 
of this case, Defendants must prove that they relied on the 
alleged misrepresentations made by Plaintiff to third parties and 
that their reliance was reasonable. In addition, Defendants must 
prove the other elements of fraud: 1) a representation was made, 
2) concerning a presently existing material fact, 3) which was 
false, 4) which Plaintiff either (a) knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such a representation, 5) for the purpose of 
inducing Defendants to act upon it, 6) Defendants acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, 7) did in fact rely 
upon it, 8) and were thereby induced to act, 9) to Defendant's 
injury. Educator's Mutual Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Prop, and Cas. 
Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995). 
On appeal, Defendants have the heavy burden to "present in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
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evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
that appellant resists. Oneida-SLIC v. Oneida Cord Storage & 
Whse. Inc., 872 P.2d 1054 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) 
After establishing all the competent evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings the Defendants "must ferret out a fatal 
flaw in the evidence" and demonstrate why that evidence fails to 
support the trial court's finding. Id. The Defendants must show 
that the trial court's findings are "so lacking in support as to 
be against the clear weight of evidence thus making them clearly 
erroneous." Id. 
Therefore, to sustain their challenge to the trial court's 
factual findings, the Defendants must: (1) marshal all the 
evidence that supports the findings2, and (2) demonstrate that 
despite the evidence, the findings are so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence and thus clearly 
erroneous.3 K.K. v. State, 913 P.2d 771 (Utah App. 1996). In 
determining whether the trial court's findings are clearly 
erroneous, it does not matter that there is evidence contrary to 
the trial court's findings. What matters is whether there is a 
sufficient basis for the trial court's findings. Schuman v. Green 
River Motel, 835 P.2d 992 (Utah App. 1992). Thus, the appellate 
court accepts as true all testimony and reasonable influences 
flowing therefrom that tends to support the trial court's 
defendants have failed to marshall the evidence. 
defendants have failed to demonstrate that the findings are 
so lacking in support as to be clearly erroneous. 
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findings and will disregard all conflicts in evidence contrary to 
the trial court's findings. Gold Standard Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 
281 Utah Adv. Rep. 59 (Utah 1996); Brown v. Richards, 849 P.2d 
143 (Utah App. 1992). 
1. DEFENDANTS DID NOT RELY ON THE ALLEGED MISSTATEMENTS OF 
PLAINTIFF. 
The Defendants must demonstrate that they were acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of the alleged 
misrepresentations and did in fact rely upon the 
misrepresentations. Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assoc, 73 9 P.2d 
634 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987). Thus, not only must Defendants show 
there was reliance, but that their reliance was justifiable under 
the circumstances. Id. Defendants must show some objective 
corroborations to the claims that they relied upon the 
misrepresentations. Id. 
The evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrates that 
Defendants did not rely on the alleged misrepresentations and 
that the marshalled evidence amply supports the findings of the 
trial court. 
The marshalled evidence demonstrates that: 
1) Defendants failed to have the property surveyed prior 
to commencing construction; R at 781, page 271, line 13 
through page 272, line 13. 
2) Defendants did not know the location of the boundary, 
but nevertheless commenced construction; R at 782, page 
275, line 15 through page 276, line 4. 
3) Defendants were required by the city to obtain a survey 
because the location of the boundaries were not known 
by Defendants; R at 753, page 175 lines 6-11. 
4) Defendants wanted to know the facts before acting upon 
Plaintiff's claim of ownership, but nevertheless 
continued construction; R at 78-784, page 281 line 24 
through page 282 line 12; R at 779 page 264 lines 6-15. 
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5) Defendants believed they owned the property and that 
Plaintiff did not own the property; R at 779-780 page 
265 line 13 through page 266 line 10. 
6) Defendants believed Plaintiff's claim of ownership to 
be false; R at 780 page 266 lines 9-10. 
7) Defendants didn't believe Plaintiff's statement of 
ownership. R at 785 page 287 lines 7-16. 
8) Defendants hired attorneys to resist Plaintiff's claim 
of ownership. R at 780 page 266 lines 16-25; R at 780 
page 268 lines 4-7. 
9) Defendants let the attorneys and surveyors handle the 
Plaintiff's claim of ownership. R at 786-787 page 293 
line 21 through page 284. 
These facts clearly support the court's finding that there 
was no fraud. Defendants did not rely upon any alleged 
misrepresentations by Plaintiff, always believed they were the 
owners of the property and resisted the Plaintiff's claim of 
ownership. Defendants never claimed that they relied on the 
alleged misrepresentations of Plaintiff and did not present any 
evidence at trial that they relied on the alleged 
misrepresentations of the Plaintiff, thereby failing to 
establish, or even recognize, this essential element of the cause 
of action for fraud. 
From the beginning, Defendants refused to rely on the 
alleged misrepresentations of Plaintiff, but instead denied 
Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the property. Therefore, 
Defendants cannot claim that they reasonably relied on the 
alleged misrepresentations of Plaintiff since they, at all times, 
denied and resisted Plaintiff's claim of ownership. 
Notwithstanding the imposition on the Defendants in having 
to defend against those claims, the Defendants did not rely 
on those representations to their detriment; indeed, they 
did all that they could to resist them. 
DeBry v. Cascade Enters, 879 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1994). 
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MARSHALLED EVIDENCE 
A. Defendants knew of the Plaintiff's claim to the 
20-foot strip of property and the consequences if 
Plaintiff owning the property. 
(BY MR. BRADFORD) Were you aware of deeds Mr. Perry 
had obtained to the westerly 20 feet of your property, 
that he had obtained quitclaim deeds for? 
Yes. 
And he had recorded those? 
Yes. I didn't know he recorded them, but I knew he had 
them. 
And did they show up on title searches in the 
preliminary title reports? 
I was informed of them by he and a Mr. Clint. 
Testimony of Defendant Verl Jensen,R at 777 page 277, 
line 17 to page 256, line 2. 
What did you understand about the effect on your 
project if you had in fact lost that 20 feet of 
property on the west edge of your ground? 
I would have been subservient to Mr. Perry. Testimony 
of Defendant Verl Jensen,R at 781 page 270 line 23 to 
page 271 line 1. 
B. Defendants did not know the location of the 
boundary lines prior to commencing construction, 
but nevertheless commenced construction. 
(BY MR. FISHER) Now, as I understand it, you mentioned 
there was a time that Mr. Perry complained to you 
concerning the --or expressed concern concerning the 
west boundary line, east/west boundary line; is that 
correct? 
That was one of the concerns he had expressed to my 
employees and they had related to me, yes. And then I 
talked with him. And I thought it was on the telephone 
originally. 
Showing you what's marked as exhibit number 8, have you 
seen that document before? 
I have. 
And what is that? 
That is a letter that was delivered to our company. I 
don't know who it was given to, but it eventually 
worked its way to me. 
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Q. And that's the letter Mr. Perry testified he had 
delivered expressing his concerns? 
A. It is. 
Q. And showing you what's been marked as exhibit #9, do 
you recognize that? 
A. I do. 
Q. And what is it? 
A. That is the letter that I wrote to Mr. Perry in 
response suggesting ways that his concerns, listed in 
the last paragraph, could be taken care of. This 
letter was never answered by the way 
Q. Okay. Looking at this little diagram we did here. At 
the time of this letter, where did you understand the 
east/west boundary line to lie? 
A. At the time of that letter? 
Q. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
A. That east/west boundary line had really not been 
determined at that time. 
Q. So you didn't know where it was? 
A. Only from the visual look we had from the two existing 
properties. As far as the survey, the surveys took 
place immediately after Mr. Perry expressed a concern. 
Q. Okay. Would you just read the first -- right here 
where it says "land dispute." Would you just read the 
first sentence there. 
A. I will. It says: "Land dispute: Based upon our last 
survey markers, Dr. Jensen's property goes up flush 
with your existing building line. I realize that it is 
your understanding that your property is 3-4 feet 
beyond the building line. Nonetheless, it appears that 
it would be in the interest of both parties to remove 
all dirt, trees and grass up flush with the existing 
retaining wall and then concrete the entire area. Dr. 
Jensen has agreed to pay for the cost of this work --" 
Q. I just wanted the first part. We're going to talk 
about that. Here don't you say, based upon the last 
survey markers Dr. Jensen's property goes up flush with 
your existing building line, right up flush with the 
square apartments, is that right? 
A. His Squire Apartments. I think Mr. Calder's survey 
showed the property going up flush with Jack Perry's 
apartment, not squire. Testimony of Alan Bird an 
owner of Defendant C&A Construction,R at 749, page 
159,line 1 to page 161, line 1. 
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Mr. Jensen, when you purchased the property that you 
now have the squire apartments on, did you have a 
survey performed? 
We've had surveys performed. I can't remember exactly 
Isn't it true you did not have a survey at the time you 
purchased the property? 
I don't know that to be true. C&A said they would 
check out the boundaries and have it done for me, and 
that's all I can tell you about it. 
I'm talking about the time you purchased the property? 
From Mr. Shepard? 
Yes. 
No, I did not. 
Did I just understand you correctly that C&A was 
responsible to have a survey performed? 
I asked them if they would do that for me. 
And that was prior to construction at the time you 
signed the contract with them to do the construction? 
Yes. 
To your knowledge did they have a survey performed 
prior to starting construction? 
I assumed they had. I didn't ask them because I had 
asked them to do so. You can ask them. Testimony of 
Verl Jensen, R at 781 page 271 n 13 to page 272 In 13. 
So at that time it's your testimony that you did not 
understand that your east/west boundary line was 
located at Mr. Perry's foundation? 
I really didn't, no. 
Where did you understand at that time the boundary line 
was located? 
Generally on those projects before building permits are 
issued, there's certain set-backs. I assumed those 
set-backs were honored when those buildings were made. 
I wasn't going to worry about it. That wasn't a 
problem. 
Do you know what those set-backs were? 
I don't. Residential, commercial, business easements 
all vary but it's usually described in the plan. 
If I understand your testimony correctly, you really 
didn't know where the east/west boundary line was; it 
may have been 1 foot up to 15, 20 feet, whatever the 
set-back would be? 
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A. I assumed it had been there -- I'm the last piece of 
property to be developed there. I assumed it had been 
there many years and probably pre-established, correct. 
Q. Now, because of the conflict of where the location of 
the east/west boundary line, there was a survey that 
was performed, correct? 
A. I wanted a survey done. That was always my position. 
I had no intention of encroaching on Mr. Perry's 
property. Testimony of Verl Jensen, R at 782 page 
276 line 25 to page 276 line 3. 
Q. You don't know then that he located the boundary line 
to also be in Mr. Perry's foundation? 
A. I left that up to C&A. I felt that's their business. 
I just really do. Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 783 
page 279 In 8-11. 
Q. Now in comparing the survey you did in 1985 to the 
survey you did in may 198 6, using the dimensions of a 
100 feet in 1985, would that not have placed the 
east/west boundary line into Mr. Perry's foundation? 
A. Yes, it would have, or at least very close to it, yes. 
Testimony of Dudley Surveyor R at 811, page 3 92, In 4-
10 
C. After learning of the 20-foot discrepancy, 
Defendants did not rely upon the alleged 
misrepresentations but continued construction, 
and# only after being required by Provo City, did 
Defendants survey the property to determine the 
location of the boundaries. 
Q. When you began construction of this project, did Mr. 
Perry make some protestation regarding property lines 
and your excavation? 
A. Yes. He had -- I guess had several conversations with 
subcontractors and some of my employees. I had a 
telephone call with him. He expressed some concerns. 
We discussed those concerns. I then went and met with 
Provo city, asked them how we could resolve some of 
those concerns. At that time his major concern was 
location of the garbage dumpster, and he wanted that 
relocated. I went to Mr. Carlson of provo city, told 
him what his concerns were. Asked him if there was any 
way to redesign the site plans to address those 
concerns. He told me that was the only place they 
would allow that. I gave that information to Dr. 
Jensen. He offered some suggestions to try and rectify 
the problem to help Mr. Perry out and I wrote a letter 
based on that and sent it to him that same day. 
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What was the suggestion? 
As I recall, without the letter, I think there were 
three items that he was concerned about. One was where 
the property line was on the west boundary. The second 
concern was the dumpster location. And the third 
concern was -- I can't remember what the third concern 
was without the letter. But those were the two that I 
remember. And Mr. Jensen made a suggestion, after 
talking with Provo city on all three of those 
suggestions. And I asked Mr. Perry in the letter if he 
had other suggestions, if we could work it out, please 
let me know and he never did get back in contact with 
me. 
Was there ever a concern expressed by Mr. Perry 
regarding the south boundary? 
The south boundary line was not a concern as we talked. 
Was there ever a concern expressed by Mr. Perry 
regarding the south boundary? 
The south boundary line was not a concern as we talked. 
With the concern expressed by Mr. Perry regarding 
boundary lines, what efforts did you and your workers 
take to try to avoid any kind of a trespass or any 
problems? 
After the problem was expressed to me from Mr. Perry, 
we had two different surveyors come in and survey the 
property. One was a Glen Calder from Mapleton. The 
other was Roger Dudley and associates from Orem. The 
two points of their survey were quite different, about 
four, four and a half feet apart. Mr. Calder's survey 
placed -- it would have been the southwest corner of 
the property almost on top of the foundation of Mr. 
Perry's building. The survey that Dudley and 
associates did, placed that same corner further to the 
east, and further to the north 
To the east by about how many feet? 
About 6 to 7 feet. 
So two surveys were done at your request, is that 
correct? 
That's correct. 
One by Mr. Calder --
And one by Mr. Dudley. Testimony of Alan Bird,R at 
745, page 142, line 13 to page 144, line 20. 
Mr. Calder, Glen Calder of Mapleton did the first 
survey and Mr. Dudley did the second survey. And then 
I believe Mr. Dudley went out several other times 
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because of discrepancies in deeds and titles and did 
subsequent surveys for several days or weeks trying to 
align and decide where that line would be at. And we 
kept Provo city very much informed of the progress of 
those surveys and what was going on. 
Q. Did you continue construction on the project during the 
time you were getting the surveys? 
A. We did, at the approval of Provo city. Testimony of 
Alan Bird,R at 750, page 162, lines 10-20. 
THE WITNESS: I know that the concern we had was that 
Mr. Calder's point showing the property line was 
actually right up to the building line of Mr. Perry's. 
That's why we asked for another survey, and that was 
the Dudley survey and it was more favorable to Mr. 
Perry than the Calder survey was. And Mr. Jensen paid 
for both of those surveys. And I think in the letter I 
wrote him on may 5th, that's why Mr. Jensen wanted to 
resolve the thing as quickly and equitably as possible 
and instructed me to do so. And I tried several times 
to do just that. And Mr. Jensen also instructed me to 
pay for all costs that were involved. Testimony of 
Alan Bird,R at 750, page 164, lines 3-15. 
Q. Do you recall when you received from the city the 
go-ahead for the continuing of the construction? 
A. I don't remember the exact date. I know there was --
in fact I don't recall that they stopped construction. 
They just simply wanted a survey. And I don't recall 
what date that was, but I know I was in constant 
communication with both the building department and the 
zoning department over what we were doing and why we 
were doing that. 
Q. So from the time they wanted the survey until you 
actually received word from the city that they were 
happy or accepted a survey, you really didn't stop 
construction? 
A. Not on the building, no. I don't believe we had 
started construction at that time. 
Q. Now you had, with the boundary lines, the concerns that 
were being expressed by Mr. Perry on the boundary line. 
Did you have discussions with Mr. Jensen regarding 
that? 
A. I did. 
Q. And did you also have discussions with Mr. Jensen 
regarding the problems in locating the boundary line? 
A. I did. 
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And he was fully aware of that? 
Yes. He asked me to try and resolve those things with 
Mr. Perry and he would take care of any of the costs 
that were incurred with the resolution of that problem. 
I want to make sure I understand. Do you recall in 
your deposition you mentioned that there were actually 
two times you stopped construction; once was when the 
city requested a survey and once was when the 
restraining order was served? 
I recall that in the depositions, yes. 
But your testimony is now you did not stop construction 
during the time you had to have the survey? 
I do not require -- I do not remember Provo city 
actually requiring us to stop construction. We hadn't 
-- the first time in may when the problem was brought, 
we actually weren't forming footings, we weren't 
pouring concrete. We were doing demolition and 
excavation. And under Utah law or with most cities, 
building permits are when construction actually begins, 
when you form footings and foundation walls. I know 
there was concern there. I know there were problems 
with the subcontractor. And I don't remember all of 
the details of that specifically. It's only been six 
years ago. 
I think your testimony was here, that you received a 
restraining order one day and the next day you received 
the order that lifted the restraining order; is that 
correct? 
Yes. And that came about a month and a half later. 
What do you mean by a month and a half later? 
Well, you had the problem with the survey when 
excavation was taking place. The restraining order I 
believe took place sometime in June. It was the first 
part of July when construction was actually being done. 
The month and a half between the survey and --
Yeah. And that as I recall, the restraining order was 
issued on one day, the restraining order was lifted the 
next day. 
Do you recall in your deposition when I asked you how 
long a delay before the restraining order was lifted, 
you mentioned it was about seven to 10 days? 
I recall you say that, yes. 
Actually wasn't the order lifting the restraining order 
signed on the very same day that the restraining order 
was delivered to you? 
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A. I know it was the next morning before we could actually 
get to work. So whether it actually took place that 
afternoon, that evening, that night, within a 24 hour 
period --we had a good attorney. He resolved it 
quickly, whatever he did. Testimony of Alan Bird,R at 
753 page 175, line 6 to page 178, line 12. 
Q. So when you first became aware that he was upset or 
somehow things were not going well, what was it that 
first brought that to your attention? 
A. Umm, I just received a phone call from -- that he had 
stopped the activities of the backhoe working in there, 
cleaning up the building and working on the site. 
Q. What was your reaction to that? 
A. First of all, I didn't understand it. And second of 
all, I just called C&A and asked them to see what was 
going on. Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 777 page 257, 
lines 9-19. 
Q. Do you recall having any discussions with alien bird 
regarding that letter? 
A. He told me they had a stop work order and I assumed it 
was in letter form. 
Q. Did he discuss with you the problem with the location 
of the east/west boundary? 
A. He -- if he did, all I said I wanted done was it to be 
verified by the city of Provo and continue. 
Q. Okay. Now you say "verify." What was going to be 
verified? 
A. Well, it wasn't going to be able -- I couldn't tell 
them where the points were. I'm not a surveyor. So I 
assumed they knew the people to contact to have that 
done. Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 782 page 275 line 
15 to page 276 line 4. 
Q. Now, because of the conflict of where the location of 
the east/west boundary line, there was a survey that 
was performed, correct? 
A. I wanted a survey done. That was always my position. 
I had no intention of encroaching on Mr. Perry's 
property. Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 782 page 277 
line 23 to page 276 line 3. 
Q. You mentioned at one point that the city --or that 
there were surveys requested. You requested them, C&A 
requested surveys. Was that request as a response to 
the city stating they wished to have a survey before 
the project continued construction on the project? 
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I don't think they would have given me a continuation 
of work, let me go to work if they hadn't had that 
done, or I would assume that. 
You don't recall being told that a survey was being 
required by the city? 
Well, they held me up for about three or four weeks, 
two or three weeks -- I can't remember -- while we 
waited for it to be done. No question about that. And 
we honored that. Testimony of Verl Jensen, R at 783, 
page 280 In 19 to page 281 In 8. 
Now, from the time construction started until the 
surveys were completed and were commenced again, did 
you have any discussions with Mr. Perry regarding this 
boundary line? 
Boy, I'm sure we did. I just can't remember. There was 
so many phone calls and so many people telling me that 
they owned and so many people trying to belittle me and 
coerce me into submission, there was a lot of things 
said and I had no facts on any of them and that's why I 
wanted the city and Dudley to at least pinpoint the 
points because I was upset. If in fact I had bought a 
piece of property and I didn't get what I paid for, 
that would have made me very upset also. Testimony of 
Verl Jensen, R at 783-784 page 281 In 24 to page 282 In 
12. 
D. Defendants# upon learning of Plaintiff's ownership 
of the 20-foot strip of property, immediately took 
action to resist Plaintiff's ownership and refused 
to accept Plaintiff's ownership of the property. 
THE WITNESS: Well naturally I was dumbfounded first of 
all, because I had tried to pursue everything in a 
correct manner by purchasing it through a title 
company, with title insurance, paying off all parties 
involved who had a partial interest in the property 
previously. And I assumed everything was set until I 
heard this statement. 
And so how did you react to that? 
Well, I basically said I'm not going to react until I 
find out who has the facts. Testimony of Verl 
Jensen,R at 779 page 264 lines 6-15. 
Were you aware at one point Mr. Perry filed some legal 
papers and got some kind of restraining order or stop 
work order? 
Yes. 
How did you become aware of that? 
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A. Well they just informed me. 
Q. Who? 
A. C&A. 
Q. What was your reaction? 
A. Get it cleaned up and get back to work. We totally 
felt we were on our property at all times. 
Q. Do you recall that a lawsuit, at least one lawsuit was 
eventually initiated over this problem? 
A. At least one. 
Q. Do you recall when that happened? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Did you read over the lawsuit? 
A. I think I turned it over to my attorney. I don't 
remember. 
Q. Do you recall if you understood what the claim was and 
about the 20-foot strip that they were claiming? 
A. Well, I thought that was a falsehood any way, so I 
didn't put much credibility to it. So I just handed it 
to my attorney. Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 779-780 
page 265, line 13 to page 266, line 10. 
Q. Now, who did you have -- what attorney did you have 
representing you at that time? 
A. At that particular time I think it was Mr. Jackman. 
Q. Did you have any other attorney representing you with 
regard to this dispute with Mr. Perry? 
A. For a short time I think a Mr. Glazier, as I remember, 
wrote a memorandum to them, to Mr. Clint and Mr. Perry. 
Q. Do you recall how much you paid Mr. Glazier for his 
services? Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 780 page 266, 
line 16-25 
Q. (BY MR. BRADFORD) Have you retained the firm of 
Bradford and Brady to represent you in this matter? 
A. I have. Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 780 page 268, 
lines 4-7 
Q. But there was one time you testified, too, that they 
came into your office and they had indicated to you 
that they had received a deed to a 20-foot strip of 
property; is that correct? 
A. They owned a 20-foot piece of property in the middle of 
my project, correct. 
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And I believe your testimony was though, that you 
didn't put much credibility in that statement, is that 
correct? 
That's my statement. Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 
785 page 287 lines 7-16. 
My question again was that you were not concerned about 
your title to that 20-foot strip of property; isn't 
that correct? 
I had no position at that point. They came in the 
middle of the day and informed me they, with knowledge, 
knew and owned my property. I was upset, and you can't 
resolve something you don't know anything about. 
Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 785 page 288 line 2-9. 
Okay. Would you turn to page 82, please of your 
deposition. 
What page? 
82. 
Okay. 
I'll read, starting with line 
your answers: "And they came 
is that correct?" 
"That's correct." 
"What do you recall being discussed at that meeting?" 
"Mr. Clint, I was informed, he had been a past employee 
of a title insurance company and had discovered that 
this void had occurred in my lot, that they had title 
to or a deed to -- what do you call it, a quitclaim 
deed to." 
"Do you specifically recall any other discussion?" 
"I was pretty busy." 
"What was your response?" 
"I couldn't even believe it." 
"Did you make any comment to them?" 
"I just said, and I asked them, I probably told them I 
don't believe it. We'll have to have the attorneys 
check it out." 
"What did you do at that meeting to check it out?" 
Called Mr. Jackman. At that point I think --he was my 
attorney as I recall." 
"Did you do anything else?" 
"I went back to work." Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 
785 page 288 line 10 to page 289 line 17. 
7 and if you'll just read 
into your Provo office; 
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Q. (BY MR. FISHER) Did you at some point become aware --
or you did become aware at some point that there was a 
problem with the legal description which created a 
20-foot strip of property on your east/west boundary 
line which did not appear to be in your deed, correct? 
A. Only at the time of the meeting with Jackman. 
Q. And when did that meeting take place? 
A. I don't have the date. 
Q. Okay. Was that during the period of time that the 
surveys were being performed or just after? 
A. It was just -- I think probably just -- probably right 
during the same time. 
Q. Is it fair to say once you learned that again, you just 
let the attorneys, the surveyors and C&A construction 
take care of it; is that correct? 
A. Well, I couldn't correct it. I mean I had all the 
powers that be, C&A, the attorneys, Dudley and the 
Provo city, were all there. If I felt they couldn't do 
it, I surely couldn't. Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 
786-787 page 293 line 21 to page 284 line 16. 
Q. Line 20: "What was the next thing you did specifically 
to determine whether or not you were the owner or you 
were the owner of this 20-foot strip of property, other 
than contact Mr. Jackman?" 
A. That's it. He was my attorney --" Oh excuse me. 
"That's it. Had him contact whatever parties he 
thought he could to resolve it." Testimony of Verl 
Jensen,R at 788 page 298 line 1-9 
E. Defendants believed that the boundary line dispute 
was resolved when the City permitted them to 
continue work on the project. 
Q. Then did you believe that the boundary line dispute was 
resolved? 
A. As soon as they were able to obtain a 
continuation-of-work order. I figured they would not 
allow the work to continue unless those things were 
resolved. What else was I supposed to do. Testimony 
of Verl Jensen, R at 784 page 282 In 13-18. 
Q. Back to the boundary line dispute again for just a 
second. You mentioned that you thought after the 
surveys had been performed, the city allowed you to go 
back to work, that the boundary line had been resolved. 
A. I assume so. Testimony of Verl Jensen,R at 784 page 
284 line 23 to page 285 line 3. 
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Q. Had you ever been told that at any time since the 
construction had been completed that the boundary line 
dispute had been resolved? 
A. By him or by who? 
Q. By anyone? 
A. I just made an assumption that if C&A was able to get a 
work order started again after all the problems, that 
probably Dudley and Provo city had agreed to the points 
and that was what they were going to use. I'm not sure 
it's resolved to this day. Testimony of Verl Jensen,R 
at 785 page 286 line 3-12. 
2. PLAINTIFF WILL NOT INCLUDE MARSHALLED EVIDENCE ON THE 
OTHER ELEMENTS OF FRAUD. 
It is clear that Defendants did not rely on any 
misrepresentations allegedly made by Plaintiff. Defendants have 
never claimed that they relied on misrepresentations allegedly 
made by the Plaintiff, have always believed that they owned the 
20-foot strip of property, and resisted Plaintiff's claim of 
ownership. Because the evidence demonstrates that Defendants did 
not rely on misrepresentations allegedly made by Plaintiff, and 
for purposes of brevity, Plaintiff is not including in his brief 
marshalled evidence supporting the trial court's findings that 
other elements of fraud are supported by the record. Plaintiff 
has marshalled such evidence and will supplement this brief if 
requested by this Court. 
III. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT PROPERLY BRIEFED "ENCROACHMENT." 
Defendants' second argument is titled "ENCROACHMENT." The 
argument is brief, does not cite to the record, and cites no 
legal argument or authority in support of the argument. (See 
Brief of Appellants at p. 21). Utah courts have addressed cases 
where appellants fail to set forth adequate legal analysis and 
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citation to the record in their briefs. In State v. Price, 827 
P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992), this court stated: 
Utah courts have also declined to reach the merits of an 
issue on appeal due to inadequate legal analysis. In State 
v. Day, 815 p.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991), the defendant 
asserted, among many arguments, that he was denied due 
process of law because of the inadequacy of his trial 
counsel. Although he listed several errors his counsel 
allegedly committed, he neglected "to establish any of these 
arguments in the record or by legal authority." Id at 1351. 
We determined that this failure rendered the defendant's 
argument and analysis meaningless. Therefore, we refused 
"to address this issue and assumed the correctness of the 
trial court's judgment." Id. 
{See also First Security Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 
962 (Utah 1993). 
The portion of Defendant's brief under the title "ENCROACHMENT," 
must not be considered by the court. 
IV. THE COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETION IN FASHIONING EQUITABLE 
REMEDIES. 
In the argument set forth under the title "Encroachment" in 
the "Brief of Appellants," the crux of Defendant's arguments is 
that the ordered remedy is too extreme or too harsh under the 
circumstances. In making this argument, Defendants fail to 
discuss whether the remedy ordered by the trial court is 
appropriate under Utah law. The remedy which was ordered by the 
trial court appropriately addresses the relief sought by 
Plaintiff in bringing this action. 
The "Amended Complaint," (R. at 24-18) is the pleading 
which sets forth Plaintiff's claims against Defendants. Among 
those claims is a trespass claim. (R. at 21-20). Trespass is an 
action at law, but may have equitable remedies. Hansen v. Hart, 
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26 Utah 229, 72 P. 938, 939 (1903), Huges v. Dunlap, 91 Cal. 385, 
27 P. 642, 643 (Calif. Supreme Court, 1891). In the Complaint, 
Plaintiff prayed for equitable remedies as there was no suitable 
remedy at law. (R. at 19). The trial court in deciding this case 
has entered findings and an order reflecting an equitable remedy. 
(R. at 697-687) . Where a trial court has fashioned an equitable 
remedy, appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard 
upon review. Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981) . 
Keeping that standard in mind, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
the following in Thurston v. Box Elder County: 
With the foregoing in mind, we address Thurston's contention 
that reinstatement with back pay is the only appropriate 
remedy for the wrongful termination of his employment. The 
spectrum of remedies available in a breach of contract 
action is not as narrow as Thurston asserts. A trial court 
is accorded considerable latitude and discretion in applying 
and formulating an equitable remedy. LHIW, Inc. v. 
Delorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988); Morris v. Sykes, 
624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981) We review the trial court's 
determination of a remedy in this case under a standard that 
acknowledges considerable discretion in the trial court, and 
we will not upset the court's ruling unless it constituted 
an abuse of discretion. Morris, 624 P.2d at 684. 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1041 (Utah 1995). 
Defendants have failed to argue, let alone demonstrate, that the 
trial court abused its discretion in fashioning the remedy which 
was ordered in the case at bar. Without arguing that the court 
abused its discretion, Defendants cannot prevail on their claim 
that the remedy ordered by the trial court was inappropriate. 
V. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL. 
In addition to the difficulties on the merits set forth 
above, the Brief of Appellants is deficient and improper in a 
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number of other respects, and is frivolous pursuant to rules 33 
and 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
a. The brief fails to properly cite to the record. (See 
Brief of Appellants at 1-11). 
b. The brief contains the wrong standard of review for 
both issues. (See Brief of Appellants at 1-2). 
c. It contains no marshalling of the evidence, despite 
making an attack on a factual finding. (See "Brief of Appellants 
at 1-11). 
d. It contains no indication that the issues were 
preserved for appeal. (See Brief of Appellants at 1-2). 
e. The brief contains extensive references to materials 
which were not part of the trial record. (See Brief of 
Appellants at 1-11). 
f. The brief is filled with irrelevant derogatory 
references to Plaintiff. (See Brief of Appellants). 
g. The brief contains no citation or legal authority in 
support of the argument under encroachment. (See Brief of 
Appellants at 21). 
h. It contains only very limited references to any legal 
argument or authority. There are only 4 case citations in the 
body of the brief, and two of those are string cites which follow 
one of the other citations. (See Brief of Appellants at 12-22). 
i. Defendants have used their brief as though appellate 
review extended them the opportunity for a trial de novo. (See 
Brief of Appellants). 
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Each of these concerns are addressed in the memorandum in 
si lppoi t: of motion to strike which has been fi led by Plaintiff. 
Considering the above problems, and the difficulties wit3: 1 
Plaintiff's positioi 1 on the merits, :i t is easy to determine that 
D e f e n d a n t s h a v e n o t p r o s e c i 11 e d t h i s a p p e a ] i n g o o d f a. i t h. 
Instead, this is a frivolous appeal as defined by r i lies 33 and 40 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 33(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Appe13 a t e P ro c e d i i re de f ine s a f r i ^  r o 1 ous appe a ] a s 
follows: 
For purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, 
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose 
such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of 
litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party 
filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
In Schoney Memorial Estates, 863 P.2d 59, 63, 224 Utah 
Adv FeD. 3 5 (Utah T rvp. 19 9:J • he court adopted a definition of 
frrv,.,ou& appeal from uiac^ ' ^  LU* Dictionary, pg. 601 (5th ed. 
197^): Black'--j defines a frivolous appeal as follows: "one in 
w h d • • 'i •: • JI :•-.-•-.!•. s b e e n p r e s e n t e d a n d a p p e a l i s 
readily recognizable as devoid f me^it- in t-hat there is II ttle 
prospect that :i t can ever succeed " rhis definition closely fits 
the appeal f:i ] ed by Plaintiffs '• the case at bar. Defendants 
failed to present evidence on their rej iance on the 
misrepresentations allegedly made by Plaintiff and failed to 
recogi lize tl ie:i i i:el i ance as an esser :.. /- : :> vr. !"•" nroven in 
a cause of action for fraud. Since Defendants' rei-Lance, is a 
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necessary element which Defendants had to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence, Defendants' appeal is devoid of merit and 
there is no prospect that it could ever have succeeded. 
Upon review it is clear that Plaintiff's appeal is not 
grounded in fact, is not supported by existing law, and does not 
attempt to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. Plaintiff's 
appeal is necessarily frivolous. Defendant is therefore 
entitled to recover attorneys fees resulting from Plaintiff's 
frivolous appeal pursuant to rules 33 and 4 0 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Although unrecognized by Defendant in this matter, the 
proper standard of review when attacking factual findings of a 
trial court is a clearly erroneous standard which is applied 
after marshalling the evidence. The standard of review when 
attacking an equitable remedy is an abuse of discretion standard. 
Under either standard, Defendant cannot prevail on appeal. 
Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence, and the correctness 
of the findings of the trial court is presumed. Review of the 
marshalled evidence (which was marshalled by Plaintiff), 
demonstrates that Defendant did not prove fraud at the trial 
level by clear and convincing evidence. Further review clearly 
indicates that the elements of fraud were unsatisfied at the 
trial level, and that the trial court decision should be 
affirmed. 
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Defendant's arguments regarding encroachment o^ equally 
flawed. Defendant failed to cite any legal authority, or to make 
any legal argument regarding the remedy selected by the trial 
court. Even i f the remedy had been proper 1 y briefed.,, ther e i s i 10 
demonstr at: on that the court abused its discretion in fashioning 
this equitable remedy. Review of Defendant's brief, and the 
motion to strike filed by Kla int.:i ff makes :i t cl ear that 
Defendants' appeal is frivolous and that attorney's fees should 
be awarded and the judgment of the trial court affirmed. 
^ > 
DATED THIS ^ t? day of September, 1996. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, & STIRLAND P.C. 
Darwin C. Fisher 
Donald E. McCandless 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the f < * J Inwinq this .^t) day of 
September , 1 lvu. 
RICHARD D. BRADFORD 
BRADFORD, BRADY & RASMUSSEN, P.C 
3 89 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080 
J. Grant Moody, Bar No. 6282 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOOD'S 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2696 North University Ave. ,Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
:;r \ n < >r I I I A U 
JACK PERRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VERL A. JEN SEN, MARCiENE H. 
JENSEN, C & A CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
and ERIC ORTON, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OT , 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 900400148 
Judge Ray M I liirduij.1, 
iriii ABOVE CIN i n JL tu and numbered cause came on regularly ior tnai on March 
23-24, 1994, the Honorable Ray M. Harding presiding. The parties having waived a jury, the 
matter was tried to the Court with Darwin C. Fisher appearing as attorney for Plaintiff Jack 
Perry and Richard Bradford appearing as attorney for Defendants. 
After hearing the allegations and proofs of the parties and the arguments of counsel and 
000 634 
being fully advised herein, and having issued an order of default against Defendant Eric Orton, 
the Coui t now finds in favoi of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants and hereby makes the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which constitutes the decision of the Court 
herein. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Jack Perry is a resident of I Jta li Coi mtj State of I Jta l:i 
2. Defendants \ en Jensen and Margene H. Jensen are husband and wife and are 
3. Defendant C & A Construction, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of 
the State of Utah having its principal place of business . Jtah County, State of Utah. 
4. Most of the events forming the basis of the causes of action occurred Jtah 
County, State of Utah. 
5 in km in in il k'KK l>i tntdanls Jrnsvn pun lt*i >ot ihr ir.il pniptTh lnuiiril JI 'Mlu hi mil' 
900 E., City of Provo, County of Utah, State of Utah. 
t , .5 
Apartments located at 876 E. 900 N., city of Provo, Stale m - on September 305 1988. 
7. The Perry property abuts the Jensen property on ;;: -. est ana Smiti boundary lines 
of the Jensen property. 
2 
000 KUv» 
8 The Jensen property has been sold and resold a number of times in the last fifteen 
> cai s l"\ I in ih| lie nil stales in the property descriptions on the deeds arid in the surveys had 
created uncertainty as to the actual location of the boundary - .->tv - f 
properties. These errors in property descriptions have been resolved by the Court, in its 
Summary Judgment dated T* lovember 2,3 1993 
9. Defendants' Jensen contracted with C & A Construction. Inc. to build an eight-plex 
apartment building • :)ii the Jensen proper ty. 
10. In May 1989, construction began on the 8-plex apartment building. 
Defendants Jensen did not perform a survey when they purchased the property in 
March 1988, nor did they perform a siinev piu'i (- ll" M'F'J' CIIIHIICI11 ><" nMrJuidion 
12. A survey of the Jensen property was performed in 1985 by Dudley and Associates. 
I i i In1 I »tiuln Mir I.J\ in I*>S * lisui ilu \\ \ M nniiinnip unit at nit lensen property 
abutting the foundation of the buildings on the Perry property. 
1 1 I en y challenged the location of the W est boundar] line of the Jensen property as 
determined by the 1985 Dudley survey. 
] 5 As a result of the dispute between Perry and Jensen as to the actual location of the 
West boundary line of the Jensen property, the City" of Provo i equired the Jensens to perform 
a survey in May 1989 shortly after construction on the 8-plex began. 
Id i Hi "ri CaUi'i, .il Iht1 iev|ur;l of lensen, poiionncd <i stmev o\ I he Jensen property 
in May 1989. 
3 
nnn *?ir> 
17 Glen Calder using the same legal description as Dudley used in 1985, fixed the 
Wr.l ' :": l n linif" oil llic In mi »in i piopi/ih liliiilliiii." (he louiulalinn nl l'iir\ .apartments. 
Jensen then hired Dudley and Associates to perform another survey. 
I he Dudley survey also set the W est boundary line abutting the foundation of 
Perry's building. 
20. Perry hired Robert Gunnell to perform a survey 
.11 llic ihifiiitil >iiur\ p!»it a\ \\K wtsl proper^ lini .tppioxmiatdy o li leH Innn lite 
foundation of Perry's building. 
22. I lie Pi o v • : Cit; bi aiding depai tment, afte r the w est boundary lines had been 
established approximately six feet from the Perry building foundation, issued a permit on June 
9,1989. 
23. un jaiy IU, iyo9, Perry obtained a restraini - .:_, (loin h r 
Jensen. 
7 t "i IN lull HI I "iSi'ii | ivP.'iKiuiiO iil)( iiunl .MI null i st Mmg a.side Ihe iirsti'tUiiing onk'i 
25. Defendants were not delayed in the construction of their apartment building by the 
obtaining ot* ilie restraining order by IMaintiti, 
26. The construction of the 8-plex was completed within a reasonable time. 
27. During the construction process, the Defendants Jensen made changes to the 
plans for the condominiums that caused the ciela;; in 1 Dcating long-tern i financing for the 
project. 
4 
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Defendants Jensen were not hindered in obtaining a construction loan by any of 
the action 1 y, 
29. Defendants Jensen completed the 8-plex and received a certificate of occupancy 
on Septeml'H 
30. Defendants were not delayed or hindered in completion of the 8-plex by a ny 
conduct or actions of Perry. 
31. There is no evidence th.il thr lVfi mlanls leiht in tillered sevt.revmulinn.il distress 
as a result of the actions of Perry. 
'32. 1 • '-'i." M)t|(«n"ifl In fjeteiidanl Maigt.'ik' ''list ULTO the lesult of stress which 
may have been caused by a number of factors but cannot be said to have been proximately 
caused b> the conduct and/or actions of the Plaintiff 
33 There is no evidence that Plaintiff intentionally entered z 
purpose of causing the Defendants emotional distress. 
the Plaintiff should be compensated in the sum of $1.00 (One Dollar). 
3 , .. laintiff s property. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to damages for loss of trees, shrubs or other landscaping because 
Plaint ill' cannot establish a value for the Items allegedly removed. 
• 36. There is no evidence that Plaintiff-made any fraudulent statements to Defendants 
or to anyone else. 
5 
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f here is no evidence that Plaintiff engaged in fraudulent conduct toward Defendant 
or anyone else. 
38. The footings of the Defendants Jensens retaining wall extends onto the Plaintiffs 
proper t> 
C O N C L U S I O N S O F L A W 
1. There is no actual or approximate causal link between the conduct of Plaintiff and 
the emotional distress >nni l n u s da iu in l h I k\kiii(Iiirii; JCILSUII. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment o f N o Cause against the Defendants on their cause 
of a d inn for I rand 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment o f N o Cause against the Defendants on their cause 
o f action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled I i )iitRynnti of Nn Canst* "tfMin f ilie Defemiaiih mi ihrir i.ause 
o f action for damages for the delay in completion o f the 8-plex. 
5. Plaintiff i1. enhlln1 < • 'mli 'mnil i ' |imiiiy lln: I defendants to remove the wall on 
Defendant Jensen's south boundary line. 
6 i :. . * . .*:. ...nt are to pay their own attorneys fees and., costs. 
6 
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DATED this/5day rffMay, 1995. 
SUBMITTED BY: 
DARWD^erTlSHER 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY 
TO: RICHARD BRADFORD 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Plaintiff, will submit the 
above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, 
plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to 
Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah. 
DATED this /5da fo fMay , 1995. 
Darwin C. Fisher 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
000 63fl 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument on 
fy day of May, 1995 by first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Richard Bradford 
389 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Secretary /J 
f:Y..\peny.eas\ff-col 
~~- ~~7 /) t 
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080 
J. Grant Moody, Bar No. 6282 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2696 North University Ave. ,Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
FILED IN 
4TK DISTRICT COURT 
STATE Of UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACK PERRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VERL A. JENSEN, MARGENE H. 
JENSEN, C & A CONSTRUCTION, 
and ERIC ORTON, 
Defendants. 
INC. 
) AMENDED 
) JUDGMENT 
• Civil No. 900400148 
1 Judge Ray M. Harding 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED and numbered cause came on regularly for trial on March 
23-24, 1994, the Honorable Ray M. Harding presiding. The parties having waived a jury, the 
matter was tried to the Court with Darwin C. Fisher appearing as attorney for Plaintiff Jack 
Perry and Richard Bradford appearing as attorney for Defendants. 
After hearing the allegations and proofs of the parties and the arguments of counsel and 
being fully advised herein, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
0G0 697 
having directed that judgment be entered in accordance therewith, 
NOW THEREFORE, by reason of the law and findings it is, ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded judgment dismissing each of the claims set forth in Defendant's 
Counterclaim. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendants in the amount of $1.00 (One 
Dollar) for tresspass. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendants requiring Defendants to remove 
the footings of Defendant's retaining wall on Defendant's south property line, or in the 
alternative pay to the Plaintiff an amount agreed upon by both parties for the encroachment of 
Defendant's footings onto Plaintiffs property. 
DATED this ^ day o ^ £ ^ 1 9 9 5 . 
By the Court: 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY 
TO: RICHARD BRADFORD 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Plaintiff, will submit the 
above and foregoing Judgment to the Honorable Ray M. Harding, for his signature, upon the 
expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless 
written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial 
Administration of the State of Utah. 
DATED this _££ day of ///[ 
Darwin C. Fisher 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument on this 
/ ~J day of May, 1995 by first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Richard Bradford 
389 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
C 
Secretary 
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